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Abstract
In the two decades since the publication of Boyer’s (1990) seminal work, the Scholarship
of Teaching and Learning (SoTL) has earned an increasingly venerable reputation as a
legitimate area of scholarship. What remains contentious, however, is the form that such
scholarship takes. Despite the publication of numerous books and articles lauding
alternative epistemologies, SoTL advocates regularly have to defend their approaches.
The purpose of this essay is to encourage higher education practitioners to broaden their
conceptions of what constitutes knowledge and evidence in SoTL. An epistemological
discussion, it aims to provide a strong theoretical framework within which SoTL
practitioners can argue a case for alternative epistemologies.
Keywords: SoTL, epistemology, knowledge, higher education

Introduction
I practise and teach the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL). I am also a narrative
researcher. This essay marries these two parts of my professional life; its purpose is to
encourage higher education practitioners to broaden their conceptions of what constitutes
knowledge and evidence in SoTL.
Two recent experiences, in particular, have prompted the writing of this essay. The first
experience involved me consoling an experienced colleague on the feedback he had
received on his (unsuccessful) teaching and learning award application. The feedback
suggested that he would do well to move away from the narrative style he had adopted in
his application and include, instead, in future applications, tables, graphs and statistics –
in other words, ‘real facts’ or hard data. I wasn’t surprised to discover that the selection
committee had consisted primarily of academics from the “hard, pure” disciplines (Biglan,
1973, p. 207). The second experience involved an email exchange with a colleague from
the Science Faculty. She was negotiating the submission of an abstract for a teaching and
learning conference. Her concern was that she really wanted to write a personal perspective
on her university teaching experiences across four continents, but suspected that this
wouldn’t be considered an acceptable approach for a formal conference paper.
In the two decades since the publication of Boyer’s (1990) seminal work, SoTL has earned
an increasingly venerable reputation as a legitimate area of scholarship. What remains
contentious, however, is the form that such scholarship takes. Despite the publication of
numerous books and articles lauding alternative epistemologies (see, for example,
Hutchings & Shulman, 1999; Gerhard & Mayer-Smith, 2008; Schön, 1995; Weimer, 2006)
we continue to find ourselves, as SoTL advocates, having to defend such alternative
approaches. As Schön (1995) suggests, “a nagging sense of inferiority” often afflicts those
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who speak of “experience, trial and error or intuition” as their methods of inquiry (p. 28).
Similarly, McWilliam (2004) refers to critics’ perceptions of alternative approaches as “a blot
on the landscape of inquiry” (p. 113). The continued existence of such perspectives is
illustrated clearly by the above two examples. This situation is compounded by the fact that
academics new to SoTL are often unaware of, or are challenged by, approaches that are
disparate to those employed in their own disciplines (O’Brien, 2008).
This essay is an epistemological discussion that aims to provide a strong theoretical
framework within which SoTL practitioners can argue a case for alternative epistemologies.
It considers the following questions: What counts as knowledge? Who decides what counts
as knowledge? What are alternative ways of thinking about knowledge production?

Knowledge Claims
A legacy from the Enlightenment, Western intellectual thought has long been dominated by
the belief that knowledge corresponds with accuracy of representation – representation of
things ‘as they really are’. In other words, as the neo-pragmatist Rorty (1979) points out,
knowledge claims have been traditionally judged by their capacity to mirror reality or
nature. This positioning is predicated on a belief that there is indeed a ‘truth’ or reality out
there waiting to be captured. Moreover, those processes employed to capture that ‘truth’ or
reality are so “ ‘privileged’ and ‘foundational’” that they have not required justification
(Rorty, 1979, p. 318); they have become culturally institutionalised. Such traditional
approaches to knowledge make no distinction between the natural sciences and human
sciences.
Lack of distinction between ways of knowing in the natural sciences and human sciences,
through the broad application of traditional approaches, is problematic. First, there is an
assumption that humans can be treated as objects. Second, traditional scientific approaches
are reductive and atomistic; they bypass the opportunity to capture the holistic nature of
human experience. Third, the notion that nothing other than the natural sciences can ever
be truly objective is reinforced through these traditional scientific approaches; there is a
belief that “…people are somehow always going to be so slimy and slippery…that they will
escape ‘objective’ explanation” (Rorty, 1979, p. 346). These traditional positivist beliefs
have served to intensify the objective-subjective dichotomy, and in doing so, have cast a
shadow over the validity of non-traditional social science inquiry. Exploration of people’s
experiences can and should, however, be “unapologetically subjective” (Ayers, cited in
Hatch & Wisniewski, 1995, p. 118), and, I believe, valid. Justifying this belief leads to a
deeper consideration of the nature of ‘objectivity’.
Is it possible to claim any knowledge as purely objective? Is it possible to mirror reality?
Barone and Eisner (1997) suggest that, “selection and construal always occur” in any
representation of the world (p. 89). Indeed, it was this very notion that caused such
vociferous outrage in sections of the intellectual community when Kuhn (1962) dared to
suggest that our understanding of science could be influenced by social and political forces –
that the emergence of new paradigms illustrated, unequivocally, that there were competing
ideas about ‘reality’ and what counted as knowledge. The idea that knowledge could never
be independent of the human mind was nothing less than revolutionary.
Geertz (1973) similarly questioned the capacity of ethnographic work to represent things
‘as they really are’. Knowledge claims traditionally equated with “possessing justified true
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beliefs” (Rorty, 1979, p. 366) have been challenged by Geertz’s (1973) assertion that all
anthropological data are “constructions of other people’s constructions” (p. 9), “…and
second and third order ones to boot” (p. 15). All anthropological writings are then,
according to Geertz (1973), “fictions” as they are “something made”, “something fashioned”
(p. 15). If knowledge claims can be considered ‘fiction’ and not based on accuracy of
representation, then on what are they based? On what basis can participants in our teaching
and learning research, sharing their experiences, claim to ‘know’ anything?
The answer to this question is best encapsulated by the notion of reality as a creation rather
than a discovery. This, according to Tierney (1997), is the basis of the social construction of
knowledge. Polkinghorne (1997) reinforces this belief by suggesting that no longer are
knowledge claims considered a reflection of reality or logical certainty, but rather “…they are
human constructions of models or maps of reality…”(p. 7). And, when the notion of
knowledge as a reflection of reality moves to one of knowledge as a social construction, the
emphasis moves from a “commensurable discourse” to an “incommensurable discourse”
(Rorty, 1979, p. 347), with a focus on negotiated and interpreted meaning of the social
world (Kvale, 1996).
What Tierney, Polkinghorne and Rorty, inter alia, are alluding to is that not all knowledge
needs to be commensurable in the traditional sense – that methods for acquiring knowledge
in the sciences must be different from methods for acquiring knowledge in the human
sciences. As Bochner (2001) suggests, “knowledge isn’t something that’s tested only
against the standards of scientific inquiry” (p. 135). It was then, a “decline of faith in brute
fact, set procedures, and unsituated knowledge” (Geertz, 1988, pp. 131-132) that led
human science scholars in the last half of last century to reconsider just how knowledge is
created.
According to a number of eminent scholars, it is through conversation that knowledge is
created. Rorty (1979) claims that we understand knowledge when we “understand the
social justification of belief” (p. 170). In other words, knowledge need not have an
“essence”, but rather should be conceived as a “right…to believe”, and in doing so,
conversation can be understood as “the ultimate context within which knowledge is
understood” (Rorty, 1979, p. 389). Kvale (1996) goes so far as to suggest that
“conversation may be conceived of as a basic mode of knowing” (p. 37, emphasis in
original). Polkinghorne (1997) concurs, claiming that “knowledge is understood as an
agreement reached by a community of scholars” (p. 7). Knowledge, then, need not be
conceived as accuracy of representation. We need not expect research participants’
knowledge of their experiences to be mimetic; their knowledge could be constructed
through their conversation with researchers (Thomas, 2009).
Researching human experience requires a methodology quite removed from traditional
scientific approaches.

Alternative Approaches to the Human Sciences
The dichotomy between science and humanities is, according to Bruner (1986), “an ancient
topic, even a tired one” (p. 44). Much of the tension surrounding this dichotomy relates to
the apparent desire of many to prove the ascendency of one over the other. Yet, as
Richardson (2000) reminds us, there is more than one way that we might come to know
something. Moreover, Rorty (1979) suggests that people aren’t more difficult to understand
than things, they just need different approaches and these approaches need not compete,
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but rather complement each other. Polkinghorne (1988) concurs, suggesting that we need
“approaches that are especially sensitive to the unique characteristics of human existence”,
not more varied applications of traditional methods (p. x). So, the issue seems not to be so
much about the ascendancy of one approach over another, or of objectivity over subjectivity,
but rather an acknowledgement of differences in purposes of human inquiry and differences
in modes of cognition. Geertz (1973) captures this duality aptly in his claim that
ethnographic research is “not an experimental science in search of a law but an interpretive
one in search of meaning” (p. 5). So, what are the differences between searching for a ‘law’
and searching for ‘meaning’?

Fundamental Purposes of Human Inquiry
According to Barone (2001, 2007), there are two fundamental purposes of human inquiry.
One of those purposes he terms enhancement of certainty, developed from, and reflective
of Cronbach’s (1982) notion that traditional social science aims to reduce uncertainty. That
is, it is concerned with reducing doubt, and a desire to understand the world with certainty.
Laws help explain and predict that certainty. From this perspective, a literal truth is sought.
The second fundamental purpose of human inquiry, according to Barone (2001, 2007), is
enhancement of meaning, or more specifically, enhancement of multiple meanings (personal
communication, June 25, 2002). The core aim of such inquiry is not to ‘prove’ or ‘disprove’
anything, but rather question the notion of truth. ‘Truth’ is considered to be relative –
partial, situated and tentative. Considered this way, researchers seeking enhancement of
multiple meanings are “truth-makers” rather than “truth-seekers” (Barone, 2000, p. 149).

Paradigmatic and Narrative Modes of Cognition
Bruner (1986) presents a perspective on cognition that complements Barone’s (2001, 2007)
perspective on the fundamental purposes of human inquiry. Bruner (1986) claims that there
are two modes of cognition, each distinctive in the way they construct reality: the
paradigmatic (or logico-scientific) and the narrative. These modes of cognition essentially
represent different ways of knowing. The paradigmatic way of knowing is illustrative of the
Western scientific tradition. Hypotheses are advanced, ideas are categorised into concepts,
evidence is reported and conclusions drawn. The focus is a reductionist one; items are
defined as instances of a category. It is the paradigmatic mode of cognition, according to
Rorty (1979), which has dominated Western intellectual thought to the exclusion of
alternative ways of knowing – a situation Rorty clearly felt was in need of revision.
The narrative way of knowing, on the other hand, is concerned with human action, with
difference and diversity, and with the idiosyncratics of the particular (Barone, personal
communication, June 25, 2002), somewhat akin to Aristotle’s ‘practical knowledge’ – that is,
contingent knowledge, a way of knowing which depends on context and which is inextricably
tied to human action (Eisner, 1997, p. 261). This difference and diversity between humans’
experience should not be seen as a complication or a problem, but rather, as Barone and
Eisner (1997) claim, “rich sources from which we can learn to experience qualities of the
world that we might not otherwise encounter” (p. 88). Bowman (2006) captures this
uniqueness of narrative when reflecting on Rorty’s undergirding argument: “narrative opens
up what grand theory tends to shut down” (p. 14).
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These two ways of knowing are, according to Bruner (1986), “irreducible to one another”
and any attempt to reduce one to the other or ignore one in favour of the other “inevitably
fail[s] to capture the rich diversity of thought” (p. 11).
Conclusion
Knowledge need not be commensurable in the traditional sense. Knowledge is a social
construction and methods for inquiring about knowledge in the natural and the human
sciences ought to differ – and not compete – as they serve fundamentally different
purposes (Thomas, 2009). As Barone and Eisner (1997) suggest,
the question that needs to be asked, therefore, is not one
pertaining to the mimetic features of the work, but whether the
work advances understanding, whether it illuminates important
qualities, whether it deepens our comprehension of the factors,
forces and conditions that animate human beings. (p. 89)
We should, as SoTL practitioners, feel confident in our approach if it meets the criteria
outlined by Barone and Eisner, above. As McWilliam reminds us, “we should know as
academics that we do not have a monopoly on knowledge production, including knowledge
production about what ought to count as valid inquiry into practice” (p. 120).

References
Barone, T. (2000). Aesthetics, politics and educational inquiry. New York: Peter Lang.
Barone, T. (2001). Touching eternity: The enduring outcomes of teaching. New York
Teachers College Press.
Barone, T. (2007). A return to the gold standard? Questioning the future of narrative
construction as educational research. Qualitative Inquiry, 13(4), 454-470.
Barone, T. & Eisner, E. (1997). Arts-based educational research. In R. Jaeger (Ed.),
Complementary methods for research in education (2nd ed.) (pp. 73-116). Washington:
American Educational Research Association.
Biglan, A. (1973). Relationships between subject matter characteristics and the structure
and output of university departments. Journal of Applied Psychology, 57(3), 204-213.
Bochner, A. (2001). Narrative’s Virtues. Qualitative Inquiry, 7(2), 131-157.
Bowman, W. (2006). Why narrative? Why now? Research Studies in Music Education, 27,
5-20.
Boyer, E. (1990). Scholarship reconsidered: Priorities of the professoriate.
Princeton, N.J.: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
Bruner, J. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.

https://doi.org/10.20429/ijsotl.2011.050125

5

Broadening Conceptions of What Constitutes Knowledge

Cronbach, L. (1982). Designing evaluations of educational and social programs. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Eisner, E. (1997). The new frontier in qualitative research methodology. Qualitative Inquiry,
3(3), 259-273.
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Geertz, C. (1988). Works and lives: The anthropologist as author. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Gerhard, G. & Mayer-Smith, J. (2008). Casting a wider net: Deepening scholarship by
changing theories. International Journal for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, 2(1).
Retrieved January, 16, 2008 from http://www.georgiasouthern.edu/ijsotl
Hatch, J. & Wisniewski R. (1995). Life history and narrative: Questions, issues, and
exemplary works. In J. Hatch & R. Wisniewski (Eds.), Life history and narrative (pp. 113 135). London: Falmer.
Hutchings, P. & Shulman, L. (1999). The scholarship of teaching: New elaborations, new
developments. Change, 31(5), 10-15.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kvale, S. (1996). InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing.
Thousand Oaks: Sage.
McWilliam, E. (2004). W(h)ither practitioner research? The Australian
Educational Researcher, 31(2), 113-126.
O’Brien, M. (2008). Navigating the SoTL landscape: A compass, map and some tools for
getting started. International Journal for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, 2(2).
Retrieved April 26, 2010 from http://academics.georgiasouthern.edu/ijsotl/v2n2.html
Polkinghorne, D. (1988). Narrative knowing and the human sciences. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Polkinghorne, D. (1997). Reporting qualitative research as practice. In W. Tierney and
Y.Lincoln (Eds.), Representation and the text: Reframing the narrative voice (pp. 3-21).
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Richardson, L. (2000). Writing: A method of inquiry. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.),
Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed.) (pp. 923- 948). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Schön, D.A. (1995). The new scholarship requires a new epistemology:
Knowing-in-action. Change, 27 (6), 26-34.

https://doi.org/10.20429/ijsotl.2011.050125

6

IJ-SoTL, Vol. 5 [2011], No. 1, Art. 25

Thomas, S. (2009). Coming home: University exchange students’ narratives of cultural reentry. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Tasmania.
Tierney, W. (1997). Lost in translation. In W. Tierney & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), Representation
and the text: Reframing the narrative voice (pp. 23-36). Albany: State University of New
York Press.
Weimer, M. (2006). Enhancing scholarly work on teaching and learning: Professional
literature that makes a difference. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

https://doi.org/10.20429/ijsotl.2011.050125

7

